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Abstract 
When peace had to become the main goal of the international community, in 1945, after the failure of the League of Nations, a 
new institution, more efficient, able to prevent conflagrations such as the recently conducted one and to manage to resolve by 
peaceful means the main conflicts between states, was intended to be the United Nations; thus, among its aims was established 
primarily the one of maintaining international peace and security, and to that end, effective collective measures for the prevention 
and removal of the threats to peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace were to be taken. 
The entire mechanism was definitely conceived towards having a much higher efficiency than the previous ones (the system 
established in Westphalia in 1648, the European Concert, the League of Nations), but a very careful look must be given to the 
way in which the mechanisms of the United Nations are capable of establishing legal norms regarding maintaining international 
peace and security, and also to the way in which these norms are respected and in which their breaches can be punished 
effectively and efficiently. Especially in what concerns the matter of aggression, an issue so necessary to be clearly regulated and 
penalized, yet so sensitive, the internal structure of the United Nations (beyond the intergovernmental nature of the institution 
itself) also appears as a major difficulty. It is essential to analyze, in this context, how exactly does the Security Council interact 
with the institution intended to ensure justice, both as the main judicial body of the United Nations and in its role of autonomous 
court for the enforcement of international law, namely the International Court of Justice, as long as the concurrent jurisdiction of 
the two institutions affects the organization's ability to fulfill at least in a reasonable manner the assumed responsibilities, ability 
which is more and more questionable. 
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1. Introduction 
The World War II was not fought on European territory only, its effects being far more devastating. It is 
sufficient to consider the launch of the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to understand the 
progress made in the field of armament and the possibility - previously inexistent - to effect mass destruction. Peace 
had to become the main goal of the international community, and, if the League of Nations failed to achieve its 
objectives, a new institution, that would be able to prevent such conflagrations and to manage to resolve by peaceful 
means the main conflicts among states, was needed. Thus, the whole mechanism of the United Nations was 
definitely designed towards having a much higher efficiency than the previous ones (the Westphalian system, the 
European Concert, the League of Nations), while strong influences can be observed from the latter - for instance, the 
idea of a Security Council, of control from the great powers over international affairs can be compared to the post-
Napoleonic system (Cassese, 2005, 41). Among the aims of the organism, reflected in the Charter signed in San 
Francisco in 1945, is identified primarily the one of maintaining international peace and security and, to that end, the 
institution was to 'take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for 
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace' (Charter of the United Nations and the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, 1945, Article 1). This fundamental obligation imposed on member states 
appears as a positive engagement in paragraph 3 of the second article, as the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes, and as a negative one in the fourth paragraph of the same article, regulating the ban on the use of force 
(Anghel & Anghel, 2003, 8-9).  
But the merits of the Charter do not end here in what regards the field in question: a much broader range of acts 
based on force was regulated, not only war, and the obligation of states not to resort to force in international 
relations was raised to the rank of fundamental principle of international law (Neagu, 1983, 120). Also, the Security 
Council was granted the power to take action against the states that would breach the ban, which should have 
represented the efficient manner of sanctioning that would determine a general climate of peace, the state of war 
only going to appear as an isolated event. 
2.  Interpretations on the area of incidence of the non-intervention principle 
However, given that one of the premises of the UN establishment had been the closeness between the USA and 
the USSR during the war, the divergences between these two and the beginning of the Cold War stopped the 
collective security system from operating. Consequently, states returned to the traditional mechanisms of preventing 
war, the new attempt to centralize the ban on use of force failing, in its turn. The further development of the 
principle of non-aggression, as the ban on threat or use of force in international relations is most commonly called, 
was highly influenced by the constant issues between the USA and the Soviet Union (and, accordingly, the groups 
of states that supported one or another).  
The structure of the international community looked different in the decades that followed the signing of the UN 
Charter, an essential role being played by the USSR and the principles it defended, such as the self-determination of 
peoples, the substantial equality of states (as opposed to the mere legal one) and the socialist internationalism, 
namely the assistance that the USSR committed to offer to the working class and the political parties fighting for 
socialism in any state (Cassese, 2005, 35). These principles also had a significant contribution in the decline of 
colonial empires, decline accelerated both by the Second World War, when colonies had been theatres of war along 
with the parent-states, and by the UN Charter, which provided the compromise solution (between imperialist powers 
and anti-colonial states) of the trusteeship system. After the war, Eastern European states already under the influence 
of the Soviet Union became socialist 'democracies', and a number of states subjected to colonial rule have gained 
political independence; after 1960 the majority of the international community consisted of Third World countries, 
who found an ally in the socialist states, asking along with them for the recognition of self-determination, the 
amendment of the basic principles of international relations in order to include them or radical changes in the 
economic structure of the international community - forming the Group of 77 (Cassese, 2005, 42-43). Also, certain 
doctrines developed in parallel, namely the Truman and Reagan doctrines in the USA and the Brezhnev doctrine in 
USSR. The American doctrines were preoccupied with establishing a policy of helping the peoples that resist the 
attempts of subjugation by communist forces, and legitimizing the aid (military included) given by the USA to 
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insurgents when there are indigenous opponents to a government maintained by force, where such a government 
depends on weapons supplied by USSR, the Soviet bloc or other foreign sources, and where the people is denied the 
choice regarding affiliation and future (Kirkpatrick & Gerson, 1989, 19-34). The Brezhnev doctrine, in contrast, 
stated in general terms the right of any socialist state to intervene in another when the socialism there is being 
threatened (Henkin, 1989, 37-65). All of these permanently challenged the possibility under the UN Charter to 
intervene in a state for the sustained reasons, also accentuating the crisis specific to the post-war period.  
In the light of these circumstances, it is important to analyze how this continuous conflict among different groups 
of states influenced the establishment of the principle of non-aggression, subsequently obstructing or limiting its 
application. 
The text of paragraph 2 of the fourth article of the UN Charter states the imperative that all the members of the 
organization shall refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force, either against another state's 
territorial integrity or political independence, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations. If an evolution is to be noted from the previous regulations regarding the use of force (The Covenant of the 
League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact), in the sense of being prohibited, for the first time, the threat of force as 
well, the notion of force was initially interpreted in its narrow meaning, namely exclusively armed force; against this 
tendency, the socialist states, together with the developing countries, argued for an interpretation as broad as 
possible of the principle, which would also include other types of constraints, such as economic or political, which 
are all forms of manifesting force, being therefore contrary to the principle of non-aggression.    
Between the two manners of regarding the prohibition in Article 2 par. 4 a compromise was found in the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970) and in the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 
regarding the Definition of Aggression (1974).  
The 1970 Declaration reaffirms the principle according to which states have a duty to refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, such an act constituting a violation of 
international law and the Charter and that cannot be employed as a manner of settling international issues. 
Moreover, the war of aggression is classified as a crime against the peace for which there is responsibility under 
international law, being prohibited as well the propaganda for wars of aggression. The Declaration further provides 
for territorial issues (including international lines of demarcation), in the sense that the existing international 
boundaries cannot be violated through threat or use of force, and also for the ban on acts of reprisals involving the 
use of force and the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples of their right to self-
determination, freedom and independence. According to the Declaration, the territory of a State shall not be object 
to military occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter, and it shall 
not be the object of acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force, therefore no territorial acquisition of this 
sort shall be recognized as legal. Also, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats 
against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements are considered to be in 
violation of international law (General Assembly Resolution A/RES/25/2625, 1970). 
If the merits of the Declaration are numerous, so are the matters insufficiently regulated; the political, economic, 
military or other sorts of pressures, intensely requested by the group of socialist and developing countries to be 
included in the principle of non-aggression, were included in the principle of non-intervention, the responsibility for 
the aggressive acts specific to the war of aggression was not provided, nor specified the sphere of the prohibition, 
and, in general, the requests to ban not only the war of aggression, but any other acts of aggression, or to outlaw not 
only territorial acquisitions, but also any other advantages resulting from the resort to threat or use of force (Neagu, 
1983,135-137), didn't find a positive answer in the text of the Declaration.   
In the 1974 Resolution regarding the Definition of Aggression it is specified that no consideration of whatever 
nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression, and are 
indicated the acts that qualify as 'aggression' (not exhaustively). However, it appears in the document a notion that 
tends to diminish its effects, in the sense that it's in the power of the Security Council to conclude that a 
determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant 
circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity (General 
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Assembly Resolution A/RES/29/3314, 1974). Therefore, since the assertion of the principle certain progresses 
occurred, such as the ban on extreme forms of economic coercion that amounts to a threat to peace, but this progress 
stops at the possibility of the Security Council to assess the gravity of that act.  
It is considered that none of the two groups of states with different opinions 'won' in the light of these subsequent 
regulations the desired interpretation, this model satisfying some demands from both sides. Moreover, the 
interpretation of the principle of non-aggression must take into account the general rules that allow, exceptionally, 
the use of force, this need to 'supplement' the principle with rules of exception constituting, in fact, a real 'Achilles 
heel' (Cassese, 2005, 56-57) of the prohibition, as a source of abuses to the great powers or to the states they 
support.        
With the emergence and crystallization of the principle of non-aggression in international law, several of its 
institutions ceased to be legal, such as the right to declare war, with the exceptions established by the Charter. It 
disappeared, as well, 'the winner's right', being dismantled the institutions regarding the conquest of territories by 
force or the contributions of war specific to the period in which was simply an attribute of state sovereignty and a 
viable alternative to peace. On the contrary, the victim of aggression is entitled to compensation, 'the winner's right' 
being replaced with the responsibility of the aggressor state, and the contribution of war with reparation. Also, 
against the aggressor state the other members of the international community can take a series of measures that can 
go up to collective sanctions (Niciu, 1968, 154-158). 
3. Issues regarding the responsibility of the aggressor state 
The matter of state responsibility refers to the legal consequences of the internationally wrongful act committed 
by a state, namely the obligations of the guilty on one hand, and the rights and powers of the victim state, on the 
other. In traditional international law, the customary rules provided that, if a state was to breach an obligation 
imposed by international norms, it had an international responsibility for such a violation, and had to make 
reparations, while the prejudiced state was entitled to self help either involving the use of force (armed reprisals, 
war), or lacking it (economic sanctions, suspension or termination of a treaty etc.). These were all elements of state 
practice, not legal categories that had to be used in a certain situation, being at the discretion of the victim if and 
when it would resort to such measures and which ones to use (it could be restitution in kind, to restore the previous 
situation, compensation in a certain amount of money or satisfaction, such as an apology, an expression of regret, 
greeting the flag etc.). Only states could be subjects of this liability, and state responsibility was a bilateral 
relationship between the two (Cassese, 2005, 241-243). 
The current regulation on state responsibility was strongly influenced by the International Law Commission, 
whose reports, along with the debates within the Commission and states' reaction (individual and within the General 
Assembly) led to the adoption, in 2001, of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts. Among the key features of this new type of law are the fact that a number of previously controversial rules 
were clarified and properly specified (the nature of damage necessary for a state to be considered 'injured', the 
circumstances precluding illegality etc.), the fact that there appeared a general obligation regarding the effort of 
settling disputes peacefully before resorting to countermeasures, and two classes of responsibility, the ordinary one 
and the aggravated one, which is specific to the violation of some general fundamental rules regarding peace, human 
rights etc. While the individual criminal responsibility was enormously expanded (Cassese, 2005, 244-245), it is 
considered that, if the agents of the state may be held liable criminally, the state can only be held responsible for 
delicts, since it cannot have, unlike its official, mens rea (Brownlie, 1963, 150-166).   
Thus, discussing state responsibility as it is regulated within the United Nations, the 2001 Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States, establishing the fact that state responsibility is entailed for every internationally wrongful 
act, also states the elements of such an act, namely that such a conduct (action or omission) is attributable to a state 
under international law, and that conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state. To speak of 
an unlawful act committed by a state, certain elements are also necessary, both subjective, namely the imputability 
to a state of the conduct (action or omission) of an individual contrary to an international obligation, and, in some 
limited instances, the fault of the state official performing the wrongful act, and objective, namely the inconsistency 
of particular conduct with an international obligation, a material or moral damage to another international subject 
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and the absence of any of the various circumstances precluding wrongfulness, such as consent, self-defence, force 
majeure, distress and necessity (Cassese, 2005, 245-258).    
Yet the text refers to two different types of state responsibility. The ordinary responsibility has a 'private' 
character, manifesting itself as a bilateral relation between two states due to violations of international obligations 
established by bilateral treaties or of multilateral conventions or general rules laying down 'synallagmatic' 
obligations, that is, rules protecting reciprocal interests of states (economic and commercial relations, the reciprocal 
treatment of nationals etc.). Aggravated responsibility arises when a state violates a rule laying down a 'community 
obligation', that is either a customary obligation erga omnes protecting fundamental values such as peace, human 
rights or the self-determination of peoples, or an obligation erga omnes contractantes laid down in a multilateral 
treaty safeguarding those fundamental values. In the case of this type of responsibility, the damage (moral or 
material), if it exists, is not an indispensable element of state responsibility. What matters is that the breach results in 
the infringement of a state's right to compliance by any other state (or contracting state) with the obligation. 
Between the delinquent state or all other states (or all other contracting states) a 'public relation' comes into being, 
which means that any other state, regardless of whether or not it has been materially or morally damaged by the 
breach, can invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoer. Therefore, the states that take action to invoke this class of 
responsibility don't pursue a personal or individual interest, but a community interest, acting on behalf of the whole 
world community (or the plurality of states parties to the multilateral treaty). All the states entitled to demand 
compliance with the obligation that has been infringed may take a host of remedial actions designed to impel the 
delinquent state to cease its wrongdoing or to make reparation, and the invocation of the responsibility of the 
wrongdoer may also be made by a competent international body, either on its own initiative, or at the request of a 
state (Cassese, 2005,  262-263). 
If both categories of responsibility share the legal regulation of the subjective and objective elements of 
responsibility, they do not have in common the issues regarding the nature and gravity of the breached obligation, 
damage and fault (Cassese, 2005, 272).  
First of all, the question whether a qualitative distinction must be recognized between the different breaches of 
international law found their answer in the 1970 solution of the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona 
Traction case, when the Court established that an essential distinction must be drawn between the obligations of a 
state towards the international community and those appeared towards another state in the field of diplomatic 
protection; by their nature, the first ones are of interest to all the states. Due to the importance of the rights involved, 
all states can have a legal interest in their protection, these being erga omnes obligations. Aggravated responsibility, 
therefore, refers to obligations regarding fundamental values, the respect of which is owed to all the members of the 
international community, and the right to invoke it belongs to any state, regardless of which it was or not injured 
through the unlawful act, and is exercised on behalf of the international community, not only in the interest of the 
state directly affected. However, aggravated responsibility applies only where the breach of such an obligation is 
gross or systematic, serious or large scale, such as aggression or genocide (Cassese, 2005, 272). As the International 
Law Commission appreciates in its own Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, the 
obligations that Art. 40 refers to appear from those subjective rules of conduct that prohibit what has come to be 
seen as intolerable because of the threat they present towards the survival of the states and their peoples and to the 
most basic human values (ILC Commentaries...). Secondly, if in the case of ordinary responsibility the existence of 
damage (moral or material) was necessary for the existence of the wrongful act, aggravated responsibility appears 
regardless of this element, the simple breach of such an obligation being sufficient to entail responsibility. Thirdly, 
in what concerns the matter of guilt, intention is inherent to this class of responsibility and it doesn't have to be 
proved by the claimant state (Cassese, 2005, 272-273).   
 With regard to the obligations of the state that is internationally responsible, the provisions of the Second 
Chapter of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States would apply, being regulated the restitution (in the sense of 
restoring the previous situation), compensation and satisfaction, owed not only to the victim state (in the case of the 
ordinary responsibility), but also to the other members of the international community.  
If the responsible state has not taken immediate action to discontinue the wrongful act or has not complied with 
the form of reparation sought by the claiming states, these have the right to bring the matter to the attention of the 
competent international bodies, and, if these bodies take no action, or their action has not brought about cessation of 
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the wrong or adequate reparation, all states are empowered to resort to peaceful countermeasures on an individual 
basis; of course, in the case of armed aggression, states are also entitled to resort to collective self-defence (Cassese, 
2005, 274-275), provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter.  
There is also the possibility that the United Nations security system would operate, in the sense that, if the 
Security Council considers that a massive breach of the obligations regarding the entire international community 
amounts to a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression (UN Charter, Article 39), the Council can 
decide the use of measures that do not involve the use of armed force, according to Article 41 of the UN Charter 
(collective sanctions), or it can authorize states to take such measures against the state that is committing the 
wrongful act, or it can act according to Article 42 of the Charter, if these measures would not be adequate or proved 
not to be adequate. Therefore, since the 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States clearly states that these 
articles are without prejudice to the UN Charter (Draft articles..., 2001, Article 59), if the international wrongful act 
belongs to the sphere of Article 39 of the UN Charter, the matter falls into the force of the Security Council, which 
takes over, and individual states may only take action to the extent allowed by the UN Charter, namely individual or 
collective self-defence, or recommended, authorized or decided upon by the Security Council (Cassese, 2005,  275).    
The use of collective sanctions is preferred to the countermeasures taken by states individually, since they are 
taken by a plurality of states following the decisions or recommendations of the Security Council (Cassese, 2005, 
311). In this sense, Article 41 of the Charter stipulates what measures not involving the use of armed force can be 
taken to give effect to the decisions of the Security Council, for the peace and international security to be maintained 
or restored; these measures can have an economic character, such as the complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, or a diplomatic character, 
such as the severance of diplomatic relations. 
Collective enforcement must aim at inducing the delinquent state to discontinue its misbehaviour and they 
shouldn't be used as an instrument for gaining political or diplomatic advantages, in short, they must not be abused. 
The intention is not to prejudice the delinquent state in the economic field, and the history of international relations 
proves the ineffectiveness in practice of economic sanctions. They are intended to dramatize and articulate the 
condemnation of a certain form of behaviour and to 'delegitimize' it, in other words, the intention is to prove to 
world public opinion that the responsible state was wrong, acted contrary to internationally accepted standards 
(Cassese, 2005, 312).         
International practice shows that various notions have become firmly embedded in the international community, 
such as the fact that there exist some values of concern for any member of the international community, that serious 
breaches of those values affect any of its members, regardless of whether or not that breach directly damages interest 
or concerns of a member, and that any member of the community is authorized to take steps to demand cessation of 
the serious breach (Cassese, 2005, 269). If in the case of ordinary responsibility the consequences of the wrongful 
act give rise to a bilateral relation between the responsible state and the victim state, the whole situation remaining a 
private matter, in the case of genocide, torture, serious examples of racial discrimination or crimes against humanity, 
the aggravated responsibility entailed would function on a different principle, involving the whole international 
community. If it is a good signal after all that the states are willing to react to serious breaches of international law 
through institutional mechanisms such as the Security Council, General Assembly, bodies of the regional 
organizations or NATO, the states still hesitate to use the possibilities opened by the concept of aggravated 
responsibility, due to the lack of interest in situations that aren't in their own direct and immediate interest. 
Unfortunately, the actions taken by states in the international community are primarily intended to defend their own 
interests, which makes obvious the contradiction between the philosophy of the United Nations and its practice, 
contradiction that is caused, certainly, by the political factor. If it is somewhat expected that the political factor 
would intervene and affect the concept of state responsibility as it is regulated within the UN, it is shameful that it 
sometimes has the same effect on the judicial body of the organization, the International Court of Justice. 
4. Issues regarding the relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council 
The member states of the United Nations have yet another solution in dealing with the divergences among them 
involving aggression, separate from the mechanism of entailing state responsibility and from the appeal to the 
Security Council's right to recommend or decide for collective sanctions, and that is the judicial mechanism of the 
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organization, mainly represented by the International Court of Justice. The main judicial body of the United Nations 
was established through the UN Charter, to which all member states are ipso facto parts of, and the Statute of the 
Court (which contains the regulation of both general principles, and some particular problems with a legal 
specificity of organization and procedure - Elian, 1970, 40) is also part of the Charter.  
The relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council may be approached from the 
perspective of the Charter and the way it delimits the competences between the two organs and regulates the 
exercise of their concurrent powers, especially since the Court has a dual, ambivalent role, being not only the 
principal judicial organ of the UN, but also an autonomous adjudicative body with the function of applying 
international law to such disputes between states as are brought before it (Gowlland-Debbas, 1994, 643).   
Ratione materiae, the International Court of Justice is only competent in legal, not political issues, therefore only 
on the disputes arising because of a disagreement over a situation of law or fact, of a conflict or opposition of legal 
theses or interests. Ratione personae, only states can submit disputes for resolution by the Court's jurisdiction 
(Dumitru, Bușe & Belea, 2007, 56-57), to which jurisdiction non-member states have the possibility to benefit from 
by adhering to its Statute (since member states have this possibility de jure). The jurisdiction of the Court has, 
however, an optional character, the UN Charter clearly stating (in which regards the peaceful settlement of disputes) 
that the states parties to any dispute the prolonging of which may endanger the maintaining of international peace 
and security have the obligation of seeking a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice, and the 
Security Council can call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means (UN Charter, Article 33). Also, the 
member states can entrust the solution of their differences to other tribunals in virtue of such agreements (UN 
Charter, Article 95).  
Hence, the Court is not competent to resolve any legal dispute between states, but only the disputes that they 
agree to submit to its jurisdiction. In this sense, the consent of the parties is a requirement for judging disputes by the 
Court, determining as well its ratione materiae competence (Article 36 of the Statute provides that the jurisdiction 
of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the UN Charter 
or in treaties and conventions in force). In certain situations, it is also possible for states to declare in advance that 
they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without any special agreement the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal 
disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of a fact that, if 
established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation, or the nature or extent of the reparation to be 
made for the breach of such an obligation. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the 
matter will be settled, according to Article 36 of the Statute, by the decision of the Court. 
One of the most significant issues of international justice is the one of the effects of the judgments given and their 
enforcement. According to the UN Charter, each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party (UN Charter, Article 94). The decision 
is compulsory since the day it was delivered in public hearing and is final. To increase the efficiency of the 
mechanism, the Charter also states that, if any of the parts of a case fails to comply with the decision of the Court, 
the other party may resort to the Security Council, which can make recommendations or decide upon measures to be 
taken to give effect to the judgment.  
Whether or not the Security Council can or accepts to effectively fulfill this obligation is a different matter, and 
the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America) is a perfect example for the willingness of the Security Council states to actually enforce the decisions of 
the International Court of Justice, even in matters of aggression. 
The June 26, 1986 decision on the merits of this case is essential from at least two points of view: on one hand, 
the clarification or 'stabilization' of some international law issues (the Court has exposed the main aspects of the 
body of customary law regarding state liability for the acts of individuals who don't have the statute or act as state 
officials or agents, the principles regarding the use of force, especially under Article 51 of the Charter, the principle 
of non-intervention and the fundamental principles of humanitarian law - Cassese, 2005, 195) and, on the other, the 
enforcement of this decision represents a decisive argument in favor of the necessity for the improvement of the 
system through which the United Nations understands to carry out the provisions of the Charter and the decisions of 
the International Court of Justice regarding them. 
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The dispute between Nicaragua and the United States of America, as the content of the 1986 decision 
summarizes, regards the events from Nicaragua that followed the fall of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle' government 
in July 1979, and the activities of the USA regarding Nicaragua from that moment on. The new Nicaraguan 
government was the Junta of National Reconstruction, government supported by the body which led the armed 
opposition towards President Somoza, more precisely Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional. Through further 
restructurings and resignations from this government, FSLN became almost its only component, therefore certain 
opponents of the new government organized themselves in irregular military forces and started a policy of armed 
opposition (Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua - Merits, 1986, par. 
18). Although the attitude of the US government towards the new leadership of Nicaragua was initially favourable, 
due to receiving some reports regarding the involvement of the Nicaraguan government in logistic support, 
including weapons supply, for guerrillas is El Salvador (according to the USA), in September 1981 it was decided to 
plan and conduct activities against the state of Nicaragua (Case Concerning..., par. 19). After an initial period in 
which the operations of US personnel and individuals paid by this state were hidden from the public, it became 
clear, both in the USA media, and in the Congress and official statements of the President and of some senior 
government officials that the Executive of the United States supported the contras guerrillas (generic term for the 
opponents of the present Nicaraguan government).  
According to the state of Nicaragua, the contras caused it considerable material damages, large scale loss of life, 
and committed acts such as killing prisoners, indiscriminate killings of civilians, torture, rape and kidnapping. Also, 
Nicaragua claimed that, in fact, the USA government was effectively controlling the contras, that it conceived their 
strategy and directed their tactics, and that its purpose was the removal of the Nicaraguan government (Case 
Concerning..., par. 20). Besides, Nicaragua stated that certain military or paramilitary operations against it were 
conducted not by the contras, who took responsibility, but by individuals paid by the USA and under the direct 
command of USA personnel, personnel which participated to some extent in these operations (Case Concerning..., 
par. 21).    
In April 1984 Nicaragua filed a complaint with the International Court of Justice, accusing the United States for 
breaching obligations expressly set out in the Charter and treaties, invoking first of all Art. 2 par. 4 of the Charter; 
for violating its sovereignty by armed attacks in air, land and sea, incursions in its territorial waters, violation of its 
airspace, efforts to coerce and intimidate its government; for use and threat of force against it; for intervening in its 
internal affairs, claiming the immediate cease of these actions and the payment of reparations (Case Concerning..., 
par. 15). Regardless of the fact that the USA refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Court, and even refused to 
participate in the debates, although the Court established that the claim is admissible and that the Court does have 
jurisdiction over the case (an unprecedented departure from the well established principles of law that were 
governing the Court's jurisdiction - Pax, 1985, 472), it did state that the USA was acting according to the inherent 
right to collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter (Case Concerning..., par. 24). The Court rejected this 
argument, establishing that, even if Nicaragua did assist the armed opposition in states such as El Salvador, 
Honduras or Costa Rica, the only justified response would have been proportional countermeasures from the victim 
states, and couldn't justify such countermeasures taken by a third party, let alone an intervention involving the use of 
force (Case Concerning..., par. 248-249). Therefore, the International Court of Justice decided that the United States 
of America have the immediate obligation to cease and refrain from all these actions and to provide reparations for 
all the prejudices caused to the state of Nicaragua (Case Concerning..., par. 292).   
Since the USA refused to comply with the decision of the Court, Nicaragua addressed the Security Council in 
order to compel the United States to conform. Due to the manner in which the Security Council works according to 
the UN Charter, the US used the veto to block the decision taken by the Court against it (Security Council Document 
S/1428, 1986). Nicaragua also sought the compliance of the decision within the General Assembly, Resolution 
41/31 urgently calling for the immediate and complete compliance with the decision, this time with a vote of 94 to 3, 
which were USA, Israel and El Salvador (General Assembly Resolution A/RES/41/31). After a few more failed 
attempts, in September 1991 Nicaragua informed the Court that it doesn't want to continue the procedures. 
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5. Conclusions 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and of the socialist bloc in 1989 led to a new modification of the structure of the 
international community. The Russian Federation didn't inherit the superpower status of the Soviet Union, therefore 
the three groups of states also no longer exist. In fact, there is only one superpower, the USA, which leads politically 
and ideologically the Western states, in the same time posing as 'policeman' of the world, settling disputes, 
promoting solutions, contributing to maintaining peace; this role is played, of course, selectively, according to its 
own strategic and geopolitical interests. The former socialist states, divided, tend to rely on the Western ones. The 
developing countries no longer seem to be ideologically driven, but are united by the claim for more international 
economic and financial assistance and greater access to the world market. The United Nations itself, as a mechanism 
for maintaining peace and stability, is in a relative decline, while states show a tendency to strengthen the role of 
military alliances such as NATO and a tendency towards regionalization, and terrorism (more precisely its spread 
and the reactions of states involving the use of force) gradually determines a change of certain categories of 
international law, such as self-defence (Cassese, 2005, 44-45).   
Even more now, a very careful look must be given to the way in which the mechanisms of the UN are able to 
establish norms regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, but also to the way in which these 
rules are respected effectively and efficiently. Especially in what regards the principle of non-aggression, an issue so 
necessary to be properly enforced, yet so sensitive, the current structure and organization of the UN appears to be a 
major difficulty, the ability of the organization to fulfill al least reasonably the assumed responsibilities being more 
and more questioned. After all, clearly the bodies of the United Nations, as long as are composed of representatives 
of governments, are political organs, in which the political factor tends to dominate (Van Boven, 1970, 127-128). 
The failure of the United Nations in maintaining peace (Vietnam being a handy example), in the reality of 
disarmament, in other words, in the aspects that were of the greatest interest when drafting the Charter (Röling, 
1970, 27) is obvious, and it is just as easy to notice how the procedures in the Security Council (like the veto 
exercised in what regards decisions of the International Court of Justice taken against one of its permanent 
members) preclude the administration of justice, even in matters as important as aggression. It is a fact that states 
have more than one possibility open within the United Nations in case of aggression, but the countless flaws of these 
mechanisms cannot be ignored. Improving the functioning mechanism of the UN in general, but also of the 
mechanisms through which state responsibility is efficiently entailed and through which the states would comply 
with their obligations represent immediate necessities, in support both of the credibility of the institutions and 
mechanisms, and of the international community as a whole. After all, whether or not the (most important) member 
states are willing to finally step up and take responsibility for an efficient mechanism in terms of maintaining 
international peace and security remains to be seen. 
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